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I. INTRODUCTION  
At the heart of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) lie the statute’s 
anti-bribery provisions, which prohibit providing or offering “anything of 
value” to a “foreign official,” a “foreign political party,” or an official of a 
foreign political party with the corrupt intent to influence the recipient in order 
to obtain, retain, or direct business.1 However, as the FCPA’s legislative history 
makes clear, Congress did not intend to prohibit all payments to foreign 
officials.2 Instead, from its inception, the FCPA’s coverage has not “extend[ed] 
to so-called grease or facilitating payments.”3  
Nonetheless, the recent actions of several international organizations and 
countries may be encouraging U.S. authorities to try to invoke a narrow 
interpretation of the FCPA’s exemption for facilitating payments despite its 
clear legislative history. Although the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions as adopted 
included a facilitating payments exception,4 the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) reversed course in 2009, recommending 
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 1 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1998); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-3(a) (1988). 
 2 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977).  
 3 123 CONG. REC. 36,304 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977) (statement of Rep. Robert C. 
Eckhardt). For a discussion pertaining to what “grease” or “facilitating” payments are, see 
infra Part II.  
 4 Org. of Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Commentaries on the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 
art. 1, ¶ 9 (Nov. 21, 1997) (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (“Small ‘facilitation’ payments do not 
constitute payments made ‘to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage’ within 
the meaning of paragraph 1 and, accordingly, are also not an offence.”).  
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that member-countries discourage the use of small facilitation payments.5 The 
United Kingdom passed its Bribery Act in 2010 without an exception for such 
payments.6 And Russia enacted a new landmark anti-bribery law in 2011, which 
according to the Russian authorities, omits an “exception to the offence for 
‘small facilitation payments.’”7 
These developments have not been lost on U.S. regulators. For example, 
one U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) official (writing in his 
personal capacity) argued that “while the FCPA contains several core 
provisions that will always withstand the test of time, the facilitation payments 
exception is out of date in this modern-day era of commerce and sensibility.”8 
Indeed, he predicted that the facilitating payments “exception will eventually be 
eliminated” formally in response to “international pressure.”9 Many 
practitioners, examining FCPA enforcement actions, wonder if U.S. authorities 
have not already effectively read the exception out of the statute.10 These 
                                                                                                                       
 5 OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at VI (Nov. 26, 2009), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf.  
 6 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2010/23/contents; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010—GUIDANCE, at ¶ 44 
(U.K.), available at www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. 
China also recently amended its criminal law to prohibit foreign bribery. See Richard Meyer, 
China Passes Anti-Bribery Law, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Apr. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.complianceweek.com/china-passes-anti-bribery-law/article/200165/. However, 
the amendment consists of only one sentence, stating that “[w]hoever provides property to a 
foreign official or an official of an international public organization for the purpose of 
seeking an improper commercial benefit, will be punished [in accordance with the 
provisions applicable to commercial bribery].” Id. Although the law does not include an 
express exemption for facilitating payments, it remains to be seen how this new provision 
will be interpreted.  
 7 OECD, Phase 1 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the 
Russian Federation, at 8 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
10/40/49937838.pdf (noting that Russia enacted its anti-bribery legislation on May 4, 2011). 
However, under Russian law, “there is no criminal liability for the ‘preparation’ of a 
payment less than 150,000 Roubles in order to induce the foreign public official to take an 
action other than a ‘knowingly illegal action.’” Id. 
 8 Jon Jordan, The OECD’s Call for an End to “Corrosive” Facilitation Payments and 
the International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 881, 921 (2011). 
 9 Id. at 921–22. 
 10 See, e.g., Thomas Fox, The End is Nigh for Facilitation Payments—Get Ahead of the 
Breeze, LEXISNEXIS (Jan. 9, 2012, 4:44 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/ 
corpsec/blogs/fcpa-law-blog/archive/2012/01/09/the-end-is-nigh-for-facilitation-payments-
get-ahead-of-the-breeze.aspx (“You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind 
blows and the direction of that breeze you feel at your back about now is clearly running 
against allowing the facilitation payments to continue.”); see also Cheryl A. Krause & Elisa 
T. Wiygul, FCPA Compliance: The Vanishing “Facilitating Payments” Exception?, 2 FIN. 
FRAUD L. REP. 673, 730 (2010), available at http://www.dechert.com/FCPA_Compliance_ 
The_Vanishing_Facilitating_Payments_Exception_09-01-2010/. 
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enforcement actions, by appearing to punish behavior that is lawful under the 
FCPA, exacerbate some of the existing ambiguity in the law and may even raise 
due process concerns. This trend also appears to be having a chilling effect on 
corporate activity by compelling some corporations to cease all facilitating 
payments—expenditures explicitly permitted by U.S. law. It is beyond 
argument that Congress never intended this result, and surely international 
actions cannot outlaw conduct under U.S. law in the face of an express statute 
authorizing such conduct. It is therefore important that the SEC and the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the dual enforcers of the FCPA, reassure 
corporations that facilitating payments are lawful and will not be punished or 
otherwise subject a company to undue governmental scrutiny. DOJ, in 
particular, has an opportunity to do so soon, as it plans to issue clarifying 
guidance on the FCPA this year.11 Clear guidelines from DOJ on this point 
would reaffirm Congress’s intent and ensure the continuing robustness of the 
facilitating payments exception. 
II. WHAT PAYMENTS QUALIFY AS “FACILITATING” OR “EXPEDITING” 
UNDER U.S. LAW? 
Although the FCPA in its original form lacked an express exception for 
facilitating payments, Congress “deliberately cast” the language of the bill to 
“differentiate between” corrupt bribes intending to induce the recipient to use 
his or her influence to affect an act or decision of a foreign official “and 
facilitating payments, sometimes called ‘grease payments.’”12 First, Congress 
used the word “corruptly” in the statute to distinguish between prohibited bribes 
and “those payments which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual 
act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary action.”13 Second, 
Congress excluded from the definition of “foreign official” those “government 
employees whose duties [were] essentially ministerial or clerical.”14  
In addition, the legislative history offered clear examples of the types of 
conduct that Congress intended to exempt from the scope of the FCPA. 
According to the House Report, these included “gratuit[ies] paid to a customs 
official to speed the processing of a customs document” and “payments made to 
secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an 
essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity [be] performed 
in any event.”15 The Senate Report also provided examples of exempted 
                                                                                                                       
 11 Lanny A. Breuer, Assoc. Attorney Gen., Address at the 26th National Conference on 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Breuer Address], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html (promising the 
release of “detailed new guidance on the [FCPA’s] criminal and civil enforcement 
provisions” in 2012).  
 12 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 7 (1977).  
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.  
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facilitating payments, including “payments for expediting shipments through 
customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or 
obtaining adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even the 
proper performance of duties.”16  
Although the facilitating payments exception has been part of the law since 
its inception, the current language was added as part of the 1988 amendments.17 
In enacting the 1988 amendments, however, “[b]oth houses insisted that their 
proposed amendments only clarified ambiguities ‘without changing the basic 
intent or effectiveness of the law.’”18 As such, these amendments only served to 
make the facilitating payments exemption an express part of the statute. 
The statute now explicitly exempts from the scope of the FCPA “any 
facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party 
official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a 
routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party 
official.”19 In addition, in its present form, the statute helps clarify the issue by 
defining the term “routine governmental action” and by providing a non-
exhaustive list of exempted payments:  
The term “routine governmental action” means only an action which is 
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in— 
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a 
 person to do business in a foreign country;  
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;  
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling 
 inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to 
 transit of goods across country;  
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and  unloading 
 cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from 
 deterioration; or  
(v) actions of a similar nature.20  
The statute, however, provides that:   
[T]he term . . . does not include any decision by a foreign official whether, or 
on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a 
particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the 
                                                                                                                       
 16 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(b) 
(1998); S. REP. NO. 100-85, at 53 (1987); H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987). 
 18 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 100-85, 
at 53 (1987) and H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987)).  
 19 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (1998); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (1998); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-3(b) (1998). 
 20 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)–(v) (1998); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) 
(1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(4)(A) (1998).  
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decisionmaking process to encourage a decision to award new business to or 
continuing business with a particular party.21  
DOJ has noted that “[t]he statute is unique in comparison to other criminal 
statutes in the amount of detail it provides in defining these provisions.”22 
Nonetheless, despite legislative attempts to delineate the contours of this 
exemption clearly, some ambiguity has persisted. For example, the legislative 
history indicates that the application of this exception should largely turn on 
whether the payment was made to facilitate a discretionary or non-discretionary 
government function.23 But some of the examples of qualifying payments 
provided for by the statute are not necessarily “non-discretionary,” such as the 
provision of police protection. Therefore, the discretionary/non-discretionary 
distinction may not always be definitive. Nor is the line between discretionary 
and non-discretionary functions always clear as a practical matter, so as to 
provide a definitive answer in all situations to companies seeking to comply 
with the FCPA.  
Additional ambiguity has also been introduced by both the courts and by 
DOJ in published statements. First, the Fifth Circuit has determined that 
“routine governmental action does not include the issuance of every official 
document or every inspection, but only (1) documentation that qualifies a party 
to do business and (2) scheduling an inspection—very narrow categories of 
largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities performed by mid- or low-level 
foreign functionaries.”24 This seems to be an overly cramped reading of the 
statutory exception, using the examples in the statute as exclusive categories. 
Second, although DOJ has opined that the application of the exception does 
not expressly turn on the magnitude of the payment, it contended “that a routine 
governmental action could be rendered corrupt where the size of the payment 
thereof is inappropriately large.”25 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit echoed this view in 
dictum, characterizing facilitating payments as covering only “smaller” 
payments.26 But the FCPA does not require that facilitating payments be small, 
and indeed, the logic of the exception itself does not seem to turn on the value 
of the improper payment. Rather, the key inquiry is the role of the recipient and 
the action being sought by the payor. 
                                                                                                                       
 21 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B) (1998); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B) (1998); 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(4)(B) (1998).  
 22 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS 
CONCERNING PHASE 3 OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY (May 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-supp.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSE].  
 23 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 7 (1977). 
 24 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 2004).   
 25 OECD, United States: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 
Recommendation, at 8 (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
16/50/2390377.pdf.  
 26 Kay, 359 F.3d at 747.  
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This gloss on the FCPA, limiting the reach of the facilitating payments 
exception, appears to unduly narrow the carve-out Congress intended. More 
significantly, however, practically it could cripple the entire exception: 
Corporations subject to the FCPA are becoming more reluctant to allow any 
such payments given the increased uncertainty in the exception’s contours. 
Indeed, one survey of corporate counsel found that 80% of U.S. companies 
prohibit the use of facilitating payments.27 Another study reported that more 
than 70% of surveyed corporations “either never, or only rarely, make 
facilitation payments, even if their corporate policy permits facilitation 
payments.”28 But Congress clearly did not craft the FCPA to be penumbral, as 
the 1988 amendments demonstrate. Therefore, the trend toward corporations 
prohibiting such payments out of fear of unwarranted FCPA prosecution is 
troubling.29 
Further, setting to one side such concern over any potential damage this 
uncertainty may do to U.S. business interests, vagueness in criminal law can 
pose a serious due process problem. As the Supreme Court has observed, 
“[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.”30 Indeed, 
any such failure by the “government [to] articulate its aims with a reasonable 
degree of clarity” should trouble law enforcement and the general public alike, 
not just the multinational corporations that worry about undue prosecution.31 
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE FACILITATING PAYMENTS EXCEPTION IN 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Focusing corporations’ attention further on this dangerously murky area is 
the government’s enforcement of the law. Somewhat ironically, DOJ has 
explained that it has a limited role in interpreting this exemption, stating that 
“[i]nvestigatorial and prosecutorial discretion does not play a role in the 
treatment of facilitation payments.”32 Instead, “a payment . . . to facilitate [a] 
routine action . . . does not fall within the scope of the FCPA; where [the 
payment] is to secure a discretionary action, it does.”33 Nonetheless, DOJ seems 
                                                                                                                       
 27 FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., FIFTH ANNUAL LITIGATION SURVEY FINDINGS 
(2008), available at http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.detail&article_id 
=7637&site_id=286.  
 28 TRACE ANTI-BRIBERY COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, TRACE FACILITATION PAYMENTS 
BENCHMARKING SURVEY 2 (2009), available at https://secure.traceinternational.org/ 
data/public/documents/FacilitationPaymentsSurveyResults-64622-1.pdf. 
 29 There are, of course, a number of other reasons why a corporation may wish to 
prohibit facilitating payments. Most notably, such payments may be illegal in the foreign 
country in which the company does business. While respect for local laws is admirable, 
clearly this trend is more attributable to zealous FCPA enforcement than to any 
amplification of local law enforcement efforts. 
 30 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 31 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984). 
 32 RESPONSE, supra note 22.  
 33 Id. 
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to have exercised considerable discretion in interpreting this exemption 
narrowly by penalizing conduct that appears to fall squarely within the 
enumerated examples provided by Congress. Indeed, several U.S. enforcement 
actions have demonstrated the extent to which U.S. prosecutors may be taking 
an unduly narrow view of the facilitating payments exception, thwarting 
Congress’s intent regarding the provision’s implementation. 
DOJ’s treatment of the Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation 
(Wabtec) case is particularly notable in this regard. In 2008, DOJ entered into a 
non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with Wabtec, under which the company 
agreed to pay a $300,000 penalty.34 According to the agreement, Wabtec 
violated the FCPA by making four types of “improper payments,” including 
those made to “schedule pre-shipping product inspections; obtain issuance of 
product delivery certificates; and curb what [the company] considered to be 
excessive tax audits.”35 As previously mentioned, under the plain terms of the 
statute, payments made to facilitate or expedite “scheduling inspections 
associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods 
across country” are expressly exempted from the application of the FCPA’s 
anti-bribery provisions.36 Nevertheless, the conduct penalized by the NPA is 
described in language almost identical to that used in defining a routine 
governmental action. The NPA states that Wabtec “routinely made unlawful 
payments,” including payments to ensure that foreign agency inspectors “would 
schedule and perform inspections” of “finished products prior to shipping.”37 
Moreover, the NPA alleges that the company made improper “clerical payments 
to receive delivery receipts,” which were required “[a]s part of its contract 
performance.”38 If these types of payments do not qualify for the facilitating 
payments exception, it is difficult to discern which types of payments could.  
As another example, DOJ charged Vitusa Corporation with an FCPA 
violation because the company made a payment to a government official of the 
Dominican Republic to obtain a payment owed to Vitusa under contract.39 After 
full performance under a contract to supply milk powder to the Dominican 
government, Vitusa sought payment from the government as delineated in the 
                                                                                                                       
 34 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies 
Corporation Agrees to Pay $300,000 Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Violations in India 
(Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/February/08_crm_ 
116.html.  
 35 Id.  
 36 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(iii) (1998); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)(iii) 
(1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(4)(A)(iii) (1998).  
 37 Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp., Non-Prosecution Agreement, at 2–4 
(Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/westinghouse-corp/02-08-
08wabtec-agree.pdf.   
 38 Id. at 4.  
 39 See United States v. Vitusa Corp., Cr. No. 94-253-MTB (D.D.C. July 28, 1994), 
available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/e4e/e4ee6f74f542be088fae62662ca45f4b.pdf?i= 
8d69be164ca238263b35a3ed201caefd.   
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contract.40 However, although it acknowledged the debt, the government 
demanded a “service fee” to process the payment.41 Even though Vitusa paid 
the requested fee merely to expedite a payment that the government was 
contractually obligated to make, DOJ nonetheless charged Vitusa with an anti-
bribery violation of the FCPA.42  
Again, for corporations committed to compliance with the law, these 
enforcement actions could lead to the conclusion that they should not make 
facilitating payments—even though Congress specifically provided that such 
payments are fully legal under U.S. law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
DOJ has an opportunity to address the confusion caused by its enforcement 
actions and the past interpretation of the facilitating payments exception by 
confronting this issue head-on in its much-anticipated guidance on the FCPA 
due this year.43 To ensure that corporations feel free to fully avail themselves of 
this carve-out as Congress intended, DOJ should consider how to revive the 
exception. One possibility would be to expand upon the list of “routine 
governmental actions” provided in the statute and assure corporations that DOJ 
will presume any such payments qualify for the exception. Such clear guidance 
could comfort businesses that they may make facilitating payments without 
risking prosecution and reaffirm the viability of this important exception to the 
FCPA’s proscriptions. 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
 40 See United States v. Vitusa Corp., Cr. No. 93-253-MTB (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 1994), 
available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/e4e/e4ee6f74f542be088fae62662ca45f4b.pdf?i= 
8d69be164ca238263b35a3ed201caefd.   
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Breuer Address, supra note 11.  
